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Big rocks became small rocks, and small rocks became big rocks.
-
Afghani elder regarding Taliban influence growth in his area
The United States Marine Corps is evolving itself into inadequacy. For the past 60+ years, since midway through World War II, the Marine Corps has sought to become a maneuver warfare force, an ideal concept for third generation warfare. Recent world conflicts, however, have reverted to an earlier form of warfare characterized by asymmetric, population based tactics and strategies, and the loss of legitimacy of nation state powers. For the sake of argument, this will be referred to as fourth generation warfare, or 4GW
1 . That being the case, the United States
Marine Corps has an obligation to re-evaluate itself culturally, organizationally, and systematically in order to better prepare itself to fight and win a 4GW conflict.
Background
The world landscape has shifted from conventionally accepted maneuver warfare, to 4GW, symbolized by the importance of influencing the local population, and insurgencies versus established governme Optimistically, the Marine Corps can properly evolve its conventional maneuver warfare mindset to better address modern conflicts. Ironically, a design solution to this evolution can be found within the civilian business realm.
Solution Architecture
First and foremost, it is crucial to identify and understand successful counterinsurgency practices. an organization are applied, in concert with one another, toward a common goal. In the business world this is referred to as "globalization".
The following two passages were taken from an article detailing how to convert a multinational company into a global one. The first illustrates why a company must globalize in order to operate in the modern business world:
"… globalization is a result of the capitalism domination and is related to the obsolescence of the nation-state system…the "region-state" system (is) a more contemporary model."
6
As noted before, loss of power of the nation-state, specifically the monopoly on waging war, is a corner stone of 4GW. The second passage lists the five "dimensions" a company must change in order to achieve a sate of globalization.
(These) dimensions of change, understood as essential to explain the transformation from one state to another, are namely: (1) "global integration of the operations", (2) "strategic management pattern", (3) "covered world key-markets", (4) "dominant marketing approach", and (5) "type of organization vision"… 7 Distilling the article, these five dimensions can be linked to the three areas that the Marine Corps must evolve in order to function in the 4GW environment; "culturally" to "strategic management pattern" and "type of organization vision," "organizationally" to "covered world key markets," and "systematically" to "global integration of the operations" and "dominant marketing approach." That stated, the first step in retooling a conventional maneuver warfare force for 4GW is to change its fundamental culture. Another key cultural attribute that must be addressed is that in order to minimize collateral damage, and by extension obtain and maintain local populace legitimacy, all levels of command must be willing to accept greater The MRAP cannot be embarked easily aboard amphibious shipping and cannot be used effectively in the mountains of
Afghanistan. Yet, out of self-imposed casualty-anxiety and because of monies spent, the Marine Corps not only continues to purchase these vehicles, but also is now looking into purchasing additional armor kits. The enemy will always be able to develop a bigger bomb to counter increased protection, but he will never be able to develop a bomb to counter increased education and knowledge.
With cultural and organizational changes comes the need to fix the system itself.
System
The systematic challenges faced by the Marine Corps stem from three basic points: inundation of scheduled predeployment training standards, the lack of free-form training events, and training instead of education. The
Marine Corps pre-deployment training programs attempt to cover everything which makes Marines proficient at nothing:
"To be strong everywhere is to be strong nowhere. premier, yet exclusive, maneuver warfare organization must be abandoned. Only then will the Marine Corps be capable of succeeding in today's irregular warfare environment.
Word Count: 2,368
